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Guide3 min readPublished

Change management controls audit for financial systems (ITGC)

How to audit IT general controls over change management for financial systems: testing authorisation, testing-before-production, and segregation between development and production environments.

A change management audit over financial systems tests three distinct controls for every change in the sample or population: that the change was authorised before development began, by someone with the authority to approve it and independent of the person requesting it; that the change was tested, with documented test results, before being moved into the production environment where it affects live financial data; and that the person who moved the change into production is different from the person who developed it, so that an unauthorised or untested change cannot be self-deployed by its own developer.

Why each control needs separate evidence

These three controls fail independently of each other, which is why testing only the change ticket's final approval status misses most of the risk. A change can be properly authorised on paper and still be deployed without adequate testing. It can be thoroughly tested and still be deployed by the same developer who wrote it, bypassing the segregation that catches an error or a deliberately inserted unauthorised function. Evidence for each needs to be checked on its own terms.

Change management testing points
ControlEvidence to obtainWhat it catches
Authorisation before developmentChange request with approval timestamp preceding the development start dateDevelopment started before approval, or approval backdated after the fact
Testing before production deploymentTest case documentation, test results, sign-off, dated before the deployment timestampChanges deployed with no test evidence, or test evidence dated after deployment
Developer-deployer segregationUser ID of the developer versus the user ID who executed the production deploymentThe same person who wrote the code also pushing it live, with no independent check
Emergency change processSeparate emergency-change log with post-implementation review evidenceNormal change controls bypassed under an emergency label for changes that were not actually emergencies
Change management testing points

Emergency changes need their own test

  • Confirm the entity has a defined emergency change process, separate from the normal process, with its own criteria for what qualifies as an emergency.
  • For every change logged as an emergency, check whether it genuinely met the entity's own criteria, or whether the emergency route was used to bypass normal authorisation and testing for a change that could have waited.
  • Confirm every emergency change received a post-implementation review — the control for an emergency change is not the absence of prior review, it is prior review being replaced by a documented review immediately after.

A high proportion of changes logged through the emergency route, relative to the normal route, is itself worth investigating — it often means the normal process is too slow or too bureaucratic for the business to tolerate, and staff are routing around it rather than following it.

This is practical guidance written for audit teams, not an authoritative statement of any standard or statute. Standards, forms and timelines change. Check the current text issued by the ICAI and the relevant authority before relying on anything here in an audit file.

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